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Chattel paper financing is probably the least known major area of
secured transactions law.' As the name indicates, chattel paper trans-
actions comprehend all kinds of written agreements where a seller or
lessor transfers possession and control of the goods to another while
retaining a security interest or a lease interest in the goods. The se-
curity or lease interest is embodied in a writing which evidences the
debt. This writing constitutes the "chattel paper," which may consist
of a conditional sales contract, a chattel mortgage, a security agreement
or a chattel lease,2 with or without an accompanying negotiable instru-
ment. The chattel paper ordinarily provides that the purchase price
or rent for the goods shall be payable in installments over a period of
time which may range from a few months, as in the case of certain
kinds of computer leases, to many years, if heavy industrial equipment
is being purchased on a conditional sales basis. Chattel paper is usually
generated by a dealer or manufacturer. The accumulation of such
paper creates a "portfolio" of chattel paper. If a substantial amount of
his assets are tied up in these medium- and long-term obligations of
other persons, the originator of the chattel paper may wish, or may even
find it necessary, to raise money by selling this chattel paper or by using
it as collateral for a secured loan. Such transactions are referred to as
chattel paper financing.
* For K.N.L., bonae memoriae.
t" A.B. 1949, LL.B. 1951, Columbia University; Bigelow Teaching Fellow, 1951-52,
University of Chicago Law School; Member of the New York Bar.
1. The best discussions of the law of security transactions in chattel paper are in the
textbooks, of which the best is G. GiLu6toR, SEcurry INrERsrs IN PEAoNAL PrOP£nTY
(2 vols. 1965) [hereinafter cited as GLMoREl. Gilmore includes no specific chapter on
chattel paper but discusses the problems passim. Chattel paper problems are likeise dis-
cussed in P. CoocA, W. HOGAN & D. VAGrs, SEcuRoE TANsAcnoNs UNDrR THE UNIFOro
COMMERCIAL CODE (2 vols. 1963) [hereinafter cited as CooGAN).
2. There has been extensive writing on the equipment lease, most of which centers
around the distinction between "true" leases and disguised conditional sales agreements.
For present purposes, there is an excellent symposium Issue on equipment leasing in 1962
IL. L.F. 1. See especially, Theiss, Security Aspects of Equipment Leasing, 1962 IL.
L.F. 77. Other useful articles are Comment, Acquisition of Industrial and Corn.
mercial Equipment Through Leasing Arrangements. 66 YALE LJ. 751 (1957); Dennon,
Financing Chattel Leases, 1 N.Y. CO.N-iNUO I.O.EGAL EDUcATo. 77 (1963); Symposium and
Discussion, Getting Down to Earth on Equipment Leasing Transactions, 12 PRAc. LAw. 9
(1966) (an excellent edited transcript of a program held by the Association of Commercial
Finance Attorneys); Riordan & Duffy, Lease Financing: A Discussion of Security and
Other Considerations from the Institutional Lender's Point of View, 24 Bus. L 763 (1969).
For the distinction between "true" equipment leases and others, see I GH-MoRE § 3.6;
Hiller, Security Aspects of Chattel Leases in Bankruptcy, 34 Fonmmt L REv. 439 (1966).
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Chattel paper financing serves an important economic purpose.
Dealers and retailers purchase their inventory from manufacturers and
suppliers on relatively short-term credit. Often, in order to sell the
same goods to their own customers, they must grant longer terms,
thereby creating the "time" obligations embodied in the chattel paper.
The dealer or retailer often has no access to secured or bank credit to
finance his inventory, nor has he working capital sufficient to carry
long-term chattel paper. Even where he does have inventory financ-
ing, it may not carry over to financing long-term time sales made by
the dealer. Therefore, dealers and retailers often find themselves in a
position where the asset upon which they must raise the money neces-
sary to conduct business is their chattel paper, i.e., somebody else's
obligation to them. Dealers, retailers, and even manufacturers in many
kinds of industries rely upon the chattel paper which they generate
for a major source of their financing.
Financing chattel paper is in most cases a profitable business for
banks and finance companies. Both capital goods industries-such as
computers, machine tools, shoe machinery and construction equip-
ment-and consumer products-including such large industries as auto-
mobiles and furniture-rely upon this method. Wherever the ubiqui-
tous leasing company penetrates, it generates chattel paper in the very
nature of its business, and by now leasing has found its way into almost
every major capital goods industry. The total volume of chattel paper
transactions runs into billions of dollars annually and is a substantial
source of business to banks, finance companies, and other financial
institutions. This article will discuss the major problems in the field
of chattel paper financing.
I. The Nature of Chattel Paper Transactions
The creation of a security interest in chattel paper requires at least
three parties who take part in two consecutive transactions. In the first
transaction, the "Dealer" (a dealer, manufacturer or retailer) transfers
the desired goods to the Account Debtor. The Account Debtor executes
a security agreement or lease in favor of the Dealer, thereby creating
the chattel paper which is to be pledged as security. In some cases, the
Account Debtor also gives a promissory note or other negotiable in-
strument. Once the chattel paper is created in the first level trans-
action, the Dealer reverses his role. Having been the secured party in
the first level transaction, he now sells, pledges or assigns the chattel
paper to a Financer (usually a bank or a finance company) and becomes
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a debtor in a second level transaction. For convenience throughout this
paper, the first level Account Debtor, the Dealer and the Financer, will
be referred to in abbreviated form as "A' "D," and "F."
Every chattel paper transaction requires A, D and F, but not
all chattel paper transactions are as simple as that described above.
The parties to the transaction can vary their relationship by declaring
explicitly where the risks of default on the underlying obligation
will fall. The assignment from D to F may be with recourse
(i.e., where D guarantees collectability of the paper), without recourse,
or with limited recourse. So-called assistance agreements, whereby D,
as a dealer, promises to resell repossessed equipment or to cooperate
in collections, are quite common. At present there is a fashion for first
loss arrangements (often called "ultimate net loss" agreements),
whereby D agrees to accept a set percentage of a credit loss with any
further loss being at F's risk. If the percentage is high enough-and a
relatively low percentage usually is adequate since the great majority
of all chattel paper is collected without incident-this arrangement
will be similar to an assignment with recourse, but it will look much
better on D's balance sheet since the contingent liability reported has
been kept low.
The method in which A's payments are made varies between trans-
actions. In some cases, F will advise A of the assignment and require
direct payment to himself. This is called "direct notification" and is
safer because there is less opportunity for collusion between D and A.
In other cases, A will make payment to D, who will then remit the pro-
ceeds, either in kind or by substituting his own check. Generally
speaking, heavy equipment or large single contracts will be put on
direct notification. Consumer paper, however, especially that secured
by small items, often cannot be handled in the same way because D
(here a retail establishment) must keep physical possession of the
records and maintain a close supervision over collections. If D is col-
lecting the payments of A, A may be entirely unaware that any trans-
action has taken place between D and F. F's risk from fraud is thereby
increased, for F will have difficulty in tracing, and A will not be able
to tell if the same chattel paper has been fraudulently transferred to
two different individuals.3
3. One of the reasons for which D may ask that A not be notified is to make the
transaction appear to be a security assignment and not a final sale to F. The difference
between an assignment as security and a sale ill be minimal to F, whose primary inter-
est is in the rate of interest he is getting. To D, however, the tax cons"quences of a role
may be drastic. If D is truly selling an asset, its chattel paper, then a taxable event has
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Some chattel paper transactions are complicated by additional
parties. D may be more than a single party; there are cases in which
D is simply a shorthand reference for several transactions. For instance,
there are numerous brokers (sometimes calling themselves leasing
companies) who create chattel paper. Such a broker may purchase the
goods from D and resell in his own name to A, who will usually still
look to the true dealer for service. The broker then sells the paper so
created to F, and the difference between the payment the broker made
to D and the purchase price he received from F constitutes his compen-
sation. The broker's assignment to F will commonly be in the nature
of a quitclaim and without recourse. It will contain a bare minimum of
warranties-only those needed to transfer the broker's rights against D.
Sometimes there is a double assignment. D sells goods to A and then
assigns the chattel paper to a broker, either with or without recourse.
The broker indorses the paper and assigns it to F. F then looks prin-
cipally to D, a mesne assignor, rather than to the broker, the imme-
diate assignor.
In yet another variation from the simple three-party transaction
described above, F may be a syndicate of several banks or finance com-
panies. Commonly, however, there is a single F of record who
,'manages" the account and sells "participations' '4 to the others. Assign-
ments from one F to another are not uncommon. The existence of any
additional party to a chattel paper transaction almost always causes
complications, but these problems have rarely been the subject of
litigation and are for the most part outside the scope of this article.
II. The Kinds of Chattel Paper; Herein of the Special Case of the
"True" Equipment Lease
Section 9-105(l)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code defines "chattel
paper" as follows:
"Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence both
a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of spe-
cific goods. When a transaction is evidenced both by such a secu-
taken place and D has a profit or a loss to report. On the other hand, if D is merely
borrowing money from F and pledging the chattel paper as collateral, there is no sale
and consequently no taxable event. See INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 453(d).
4. The law of participation has received little attention primarily because financing
institutions prefer to work things out among themselves rather than litigate. The
lead financing institution is a fiduciary for its participants, but the agreement among
the participants usually exculpates the manager for actions taken in good faith. Such
agreements are enforceable. See Allied Fin. Corp. v. Duo Factors, Inc., 26 App. Dlv. 2d
538, 271 N.Y.S.2d 402, affd, 19 N.Y.2d 865, 227 N.E.2d 591 (1967).
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rity agreement or a lease and by an instrument or a series of
instruments, the group of writings taken together constitute chat-
tel paper.
All security instruments reflecting an interest in goods are chattel
paper as a matter of course. The definition includes all equipment
leases, even those which do not, themselves, create a security interest.
But while equipment leases are included with conditional sales con-
tracts in the Code's definition of chattel paper, the two forms of financ-
ing are not entirely alike. The owner, by assignment, of an equipment
lease is not in quite the same position vis-ii-vis A, the Account Debtor,
as if he were the assignee of a Code conditional sales contract. As we
shall see, these differences in treatment create distortions in the second
level chattel paper transaction without any rational justification.
Most of the discussion of equipment leases by commentators has
centered on the distinction between "true" equipment leases and con-
ditional sales contracts cast in the form of an equipment lease5 and on
the drastic tax G and bankruptcy7 consequences of that difference. If
an equipment lease is a disguised conditional sales contract, it will be
treated as a security transaction for Code purposes, in bankruptcy, and
by the Internal Revenue Service. "True" equipment leases are gov-
erned by the law of bailments of personal property and not by the
Code. In theory, D owns the property leased to A, and as there is no
"security" transaction at all the Code does not apply. There is no
requirement that D perfect his security interest in the property leased,
for there is no security interest to be perfected. Furthermore, there
are no mandatory filing statutes for equipment leases.8 In the event
that A should go bankrupt, his trustee in bankruptcy cannot attack
D's position for failure to perfect-a distinct advantage from F's point
of view as D's assignee. F, as owner of the property, will be able to
reclaim it from the trustee in bankruptcy by turnover proceedings.
The provisions of the bankruptcy statutes with respect to security for
leases will apply. Similarly, the holder of a lease is probably in a better
position than the holder of a security interest in the event of a Chapter
X reorganization. 9
5. See Alien v. Cohen, 310 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J.); DeRocha v. Macomber,
330 fass. 611, 614-15, 116 N.E.2d 139, 142 (1953); 1 GILMORE § 3.6; UNIFoRM COMM1E~RCAAL
CODE § 1-201(37) [hereinafter cited as UCC].
6. See INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 453(d).
7. See Hiller, supra note 2.
8. The perceptive reader may notice that that is exactly what the law was for condi-
tional sales contracts before the Code was enacted. This provides )et another reason for
saying that there is no distinction between an equipment lease and a security agreement.
9. See In re Yale Express, 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966). If the bankrupt owns the
9-39
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The distinction between true leases and conditional sales contracts
also affects the consequences of A's default under the lease. The proper
remedy for the holder of a "true" lease is replevin instead of the
default procedure laid out in Part 5 of Article 9 of the Code. In those
few States where replevin is still encumbered by common law rem-
nants, the equipment lease may have disadvantages. On the other
hand, if the Code should be amended in any state so as to include in
Article 9 an election of remedies between an action for the debt and a
proceeding for repossession of the goods, there would be a substan-
tial advantage in favor of the lease-holder.
In the event that A sells the property out of trust, the holder of a
lease interest may be somewhat better off than the holder of a security
interest. As we shall see hereafter, a sale by A out of a trust of some
categories of goods cuts off D's security interest and passes good title
to a bona fide buyer. In theory, the same need not be the case for the
lessor-owner of the property sold, although the courts, especially in
those states where the Factor's Act has not been repealed by the Code,
might find that the owner was estopped by placing the property in the
possession of one who could resell. Moreover, since the Code does not
apply, its disapproval of Benedict v. Ratner'0 would not necessarily be
binding, and a court might well find that the lessor and his assigns were
under a duty to maintain dominion or otherwise police the transaction.
There is some support for such a position.1
In one situation the purchaser of a security agreement may have an
advantage over the purchaser of a lease. Where F purchases equipment
leases, he takes only an assignor's interest in the equipment lease
itself. If F wishes to be secured by an interest in the goods as well,
he must obtain a security interest from D and perfect it. A typical
example arises when D is leasing computers to A on a three-month
basis and F, knowing that such leases are ordinarily renewed, makes
an advance that exceeds the balance due on the leases. In this case,
F must file a "chattel mortgage" against D in order to perfect his
security interest in the inventory of computers which D has rented to
A (and probably should also file against D's "contract rights" to cover
property, the Bankruptcy or Reorganization Court has jurisdiction, which in Chapter X
may include the power to modify liens. On the other hand, if the property is merely
leased, a reclamation proceeding by the owner may be available.
10. 268 U.S. 853 (1925) (assignment of accounts receivable as collateral does not create
a lien when debtor reserves dominion over the assigned accounts). UCC § 9,205 carefully
overrules Benedict v. Ratner and the Official Comment clearly expresses a policy against
the rule of that case.
11. See Theiss, supra note 2, at 86-88.
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the renewals). If, however, D is buying computers from his supplier
on a conditional sales basis, F may very well have a second security
interest in the computers themselves. Contrast the situation where F
is financing conditional sales contracts generated by D. There F's se-
curity interest in the property comes with its security interest in the
paper, and the additional "chattel mortgage" is not required; F, a pur-
chase money buyer of D's conditional sales contracts, need not worry
about the security interest of D's suppliers.l - The use of conditional
sales contracts also avoids all problems of dealing with security for
rent, a major cause of complications in the case of equipment leases.13
In terms of chattel paper financing, no reasons seem to exist for
differentiating between transactions involving leases and those involv-
ing conditional sales contracts. The differences outlined above could
be eliminated if all equipment leases for business or commercial pur-
poses which extend over a specific period (perhaps three months or
longer) and cover any substantial amount of property (say, $5,000)
were brought under the Code. 14 The lessor would then be required
to file in order to enforce his rights against third parties without
notice. The rights of the lessor would then be the same as those of a
party with a perfected security interest subject to the Code.
Sales contracts and leases are often accompanied by maintenance
contracts. In the machinery industry, for example, service and parts
contracts often go hand in hand with an agreement to purchase or
lease. The two agreements are in practice a single transaction, for no
matter what the wording of the sale or lease agreement may be, the
buyer or leasee will rarely be willing to make payments on the main
agreement when he is not receiving the maintenance which he was
promised. One might expect that the maintenance contract would be
12. UCC § 9-308, second sentence. Note also that UCC § 2-702, which gives a seller
of goods the right to reclaim in the event of insolvency of his buyer, would not apply
vis-a-vis F if he were a purchaser in the ordinary course of D's business. Under the
Code, a lienholder or the holder of a security interest is considered to take by purchase.
Id. § 1-201(32), -(33).
13. Some states require that lease security be deposited in a bank, draw interest, etc..
and these statutes often apply to personal property as well as real estate. See, e.g., N.Y.
GEN . OBaG. LAw § 7-101 (McKinney 1964). Moreover, a lessee's trustee in bankruptcy
may always attack the validity of the lessor's receipt of the security, because cash
collateral is an "instrument" for which perfection must be made by taking actual
possession. See In re Atlanta Times, 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
14. Cf. Henson, "Proceeds" under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUss. I Rv.
232, 234 n.14 (1965); Note, 49 CoRNELL L.Q. 672 (1964). The writer knows of no instance
in which the present law has been defended as making a reasonable distinction for
security purposes. It is sometimes claimed that a distinction for tax purposes makes
economic sense, but nobody has ever given a reason for excusing filing except to say
that such is the present law. There is a trend toward treating equipment leases as if
they were covered by the Code for warranty and like purposes.
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considered a part of the chattel paper generated by the transaction,
i.e., a part of the security agreement with which it is inseparably con-
nected. The Code is to the contrary.15 This is not without reason, for
the entire thrust and purpose of the Code's treatment of security in
chattel paper is to assimilate it to a "commercial specialty," i.e., a
negotiable instrument. A maintenance agreement assumes that the
duty of the seller of the goods will continue into the future, even if it
only involves sending a man around to examine the engine or to
program the computer. The transaction is not yet concluded, and
chattel paper financing is inapposite.
The Code contains one specific method by which chattel paper which
is to be financed can be made to assume the qualities of a negotiable
instrument. Section 9-206 permits a buyer to agree that he will not
assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the "seller" and states that such an agreement is enforceable
by any assignee for value, in good faith, and without notice of a claim
or defense, except for those defenses which might be asserted against
a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. Where a negotiable
instrument is given as part of the transaction, the Code implies an
agreement of this kind. Where both an agreement and a note exist,
the Code provides that the two "taken together constitute chattel
paper."'16 Therefore, if F fails to take possession of the note-even if
the instrument never gets into the hands of any person with a claim
vis-&-vis F-there is a possibility that F will be held to have failed to
perfect his security interest.17
III. Protecting the Security Interest in Chattel Paper
Against Other Interests
The natural enemies of the holder of a security interest in chattel
paper are
1. Landlords, mortgagees, persons who have maintained or improved
the collateral (such as repairmen or warehousemen), and taxing authori-
ties-all persons who may establish liens on the collateral itself;
2. The Account Debtor himself;
3. D's other creditors, including the Trustee in Banruptcy who
represents all creditors;
15. Because the party obligated to maintain has neither a security interest nor a
retained leasehold, the Code's definition of chattel paper is not applicable.
16. UCC § 9-105(b).
17. See Kripke, Practice Commentary, N.Y. U.C.C. 360 (McKinney 1964) (commentary
in § 9-105).
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4. Bona fide purchasers for value of the equipment which forms
the security;
5. Other purchasers of the same chattel paper.
A. Other Classes of Lienors
Most of the persons falling into the first class-tax authorities, land-
lords, mortgagees, warehousemen, repairmen, and the like--derive
their liens from sources other than the Uniform Commercial Code.
In such cases, the priority problem presented by their position vis-a-vis
F is a conflict between F's Code security interest and their non-Code
liens. The only Code provision germane is Section 9-310, which is
intended to protect laborers, warehousemen, repairmen and the like.
It provides that where a person "furnishes services or material in the
ordinary course of his business with respect to goods subject to a
security interest," his lien takes priority over all perfected security
interests in the goods themselves. The reason for 9-310 is, of course,
that such lienors have enhanced or protected the value of the collateral
and, thus, no one is prejudiced by their priority.18
In a number of states, landlords have a preferred lien position or
a right of distraint on all property located on their premises, even if
the goods are not affixed to the realty.19 Where the state statute pro-
vides for cutting off the landlord's lien by timely notice, D can protect
himself by informing the landlord that the equipment is about to be
or has been delivered to A's premises. In other cases, D should obtain
the landlord's consent before delivering the collateral to A's premises.
If the goods are to be affixed to the realty, the fee owner's consent is
almost always needed, but such transactions are not normally suitable
for chattel paper financing. The mortgagee's consent may also be
necessary where his lien extends to personal property under the terms
of the mortgage or the local real estate law.
Taxing authorities may also claim liens. Federal taxes are not a sig-
nificant problem if D has properly perfected his security interest
against A. In such a case, D will have a valid defense against subsequent
Internal Revenue claims against A's property, and F will take D's
position by assignment. State and local taxes raise more interesting
questions. Many states, including California, Massachusetts and other
important commercial jurisdictions, have personal property taxes which
18. See generally Comment, Nonconsensual Liens Under Article 9, 76 YA!. LJ. 1649
(1967).
19. CCH SEcuRED TRANSACrO.S GUME (4 vols. 1969) has the applicable State law
at 340 under the law of each state.
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place an annual impost upon all of the taxpayer's personal property.
Ordinarily, the security agreement between A and D will require A
to keep the property free and clear of all liens and to pay all taxes.
If, however, A is unable to pay the tax or for some other reason does
not do so, and D has assigned to F, an out-of-state lender not doing
business in the jurisdiction, some difficult legal problems can arise.
Does the state have power to tax F's property? If F is forced to repossess
the collateral (and if A cannot pay its taxes, it probably cannot pay its
finance charges either), is F "doing business" under local law?20 If F
must qualify in the state, can the state impose payment of the taxes
as a precondition to the suit? If F is a national bank, as will often be
the case, will the above questions be answered in the same manner
according to federal law?21
B. The Account Debtor
F's interests may be prejudiced where the Account Debtor has de-
fenses or claims that can be asserted against F arising out of A's trans-
actions with D, the person with whom he contracted. Further claims
may arise where the transaction between A and D, the first level trans-
action, is subject to state or federal regulation.
Generally speaking, business transactions at the first level provide
few complications when they become the subject of chattel paper
financing. It is, in fact, not uncommon for D to bring his prospective
account debtor to F's attention in advance of the transaction in order
to have A's credit "checked" and to discover in advance whether F is
even interested in financing the transaction. A often knows which
finance company or bank is going to be buying the chattel paper well
in advance of his consummation of the first level transaction. In a
sense A is taking a loan from F in order to acquire the equipment
from D. In many cases D and A will use a printed form prepared by F
which says on its face that it will be assigned to F and has on the reverse
a form of assignment from D to F.
20. See, e.g., Ross Constr. Co. v. U.M. & M. Credit Corp., - Miss. -, 214 So. 2d 822
(1968).
21. National banks have been held to be instrumentalities of the federal government
ever since Chief Justice Marshall so held with respect to the Bank of the United States
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The courts of last resort in
Massachusetts and New York have recently held that national banks are no longer
federal instrumentalities and therefore are no longer exempt from taxation. First Agric.
Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 353 Mass. 172, 229 N.E.2d 245 (1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 839
(1968); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 235 N.E.2d 101 (1967).
Further litigation or legislation in this area seems certain. See Note, 82 HAiv. L. Rev.
284-91 (1968).
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A very different situation is presented where consumer goods pro-
vide the subject matter of the first level transaction. D and F in such
transactions rarely deal at arm's length. A does not know that he will
be dealing with a financing agency; he only knows that he is dealing
with a store. The occurrence of fraud in such transactions has prompted
a great deal of regulation over the last ten years, and the flow of
such regulation seems to be accelerating at present. Many states have
Retail Installment Contract laws 22 which bear directly on the consumer
goods first level transaction. A Federal Truth-in-Lending law has
recently become effective, and the Federal Reserve Board has promul-
gated Regulation Z, which requires consumer credit cost disclosure.
The interaction between the regulation of first level consumer credit
-essentially the sale from the store to the buyer-and the second level
chattel paper security transaction-a pledge of the paper by the store
to a bank or finance company-is likely to present financing institu-
tions with some novel problems. The financing institution cannot
safely ignore the legislative regulation of the first level transaction
because as an assignee, it cannot have rights greater than the rights
of its assignor. On the other hand, the financing institution is not a
party to the first level transaction and does not wish to become over-
involved in its customer's business. The tension resulting from these
pressures has not been resolved.
The Code is of little relevance here, for it was prepared in such a way
as to avoid conflict with retail installment regulation. Although Section
9-206, discussed above, permits the inclusion of provisions in the first
level agreement which would cut off A's defenses vis-a-vis F, the section
is drafted to allow an exemption for consumer goods transactions.
Where such a statutory exemption has been made, A may defend
against F regardless of the language of the first level agreement or the
existence of a negotiable instrument.
The experience to date with Truth-in-Lending for consumer goods,
even when coupled with a limitation on the finance rate that D may
22. The scope of the Retail Installment Sales acts varies; in many states the) apply
to all nonbusiness retail sales, in others only to automobiles. All such laws prescribe
the form of agreement to some extent. Others expressly prohibit certain practices deemed
unconscionable. A number of such statutes impose maximum ceilings on finance charges.
The applicable statutes for each state may be found in the CCH Co.Nsummr Cnnrr Guw
(2 vols. 1969).
23. Pub. L. No. 90-321 (Mfay 29, 1968). 82 Stat. 146. See Felsenfeld. Uniform, Uni-formed and Unitary Laws Regulating Consumer Credit, 37 FORDItAm L Rs,. 208 (1968).
In Felsenfeld's view the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act, the various state laws already
in effect such as the Retail Installment Credit acts and the proposed Uniform Consumer
Credit Code all overlap.
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charge A, has been less than satisfactory, particularly where the poor
are concerned. Insofar as the statutes simply require disclosure, poor
people tend to accept the disclosure and buy the goods. They often
cannot buy at all except on credit and cannot get credit anywhere
except in the store where they actually buy. Regulation of the amount
by which D's finance charge may exceed the cash price is meaningless
where D's sales are almost all on credit, for the cash price can be set
arbitrarily to hide excessive financing charges. The abuses most com-
plained of-shoddy merchandise, misrepresentations by the seller, lack
of maintenance and repair facilities, highbinding salesmanship, exor-
bitant prices, unfair collection procedures-are not remedied by regu-
lation of this nature except insofar as the Federal Truth-in-Lending
Act contains a provision limiting garnishments.
24
The failure of consumer protection laws has led to the suggestion
that financer F's should be made to police retailer D's. Usually it is
proposed to force F to police D by restricting F's rights in chattel paper
transactions whenever D's conduct has been fraudulent or dishonest.
Since F is usually a very solid citizen-a bank or a finance company-
and D may be a shaky retailer of furniture, television sets, clothing or
the like in a ghetto area, the idea is not without its attractions to the
legislature, not the least of which is that it puts the work and expense
of regulating credit sales on someone other than the public. For much
the same reasons, the banks and finance companies are less impressed.
They would much rather lend money to their customers without
getting involved in their business or their morals. With considerable
force and not a little reason, the financial institutions point out that
they simply are not in the business of operating or policing their
customer's enterprises. Furthermore, they observe that this will only
make financing harder to get, thereby driving up ghetto prices, while
at the same time, all sorts of nonghetto enterprises will be unnecessarily
hurt. In fact the number of reputable lenders advancing against con-
sumer paper has greatly diminished in recent years.
Despite these arguments, some legislation in this area seems polit-
ically inevitable. Since the Code follows present commercial practices
-a point of honor with its draftsmen-it may be unfeasible to adjust
new legislation to the Code's model of consumer goods chattel paper
financing. The Code anticipates that the financing of chattel paper
arising from the sale of consumer goods will ordinarily take the form
24. Id. tit. III.
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of a loan agreement between D and F under which F will advance
monies to D to be secured by a pledge of D's chattel paper. The chattel
paper need not be delivered to F but may remain in D's possession,
properly stamped to show that it has been pledged to F. D will effect
collections on the paper. F may make an audit from time to time but
will have no direct control nor any supervision of either the sales made
by D to generate the paper nor of D's procedures to obtain collection.
Any change that would place responsibility on F would necessarily
distort the above transaction. -While the dislocation of established com-
mercial procedures is not a valid reason for avoiding changes in law
that will benefit the public, the legislature ought to make such changes
as are necessary in such a manner that the commercial feasibility of
financing consumer paper is maintained.
The crucial question to be considered is what new obligations are
to be placed upon F. The first signs of legislative regulation seem to
indicate that chattel paper lenders will be required to register in order
to do business. The sanction for failure to supervise the borrower is
the withdrawal of the lender's license. Registration provisions are
contained in a number of Retail Installment Credit acts already
enacted. The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code (Draft No.
6)25 contains provisions requiring the licensing of all persons who pur-
chase consumer chattel paper, except regulated financial institutions.
These provisions are controversial. The exemption for regulated finan-
cial institutions suggests that the direction of the proposed regulation
would be toward assimilating all consumer paper lenders to those
lending institutions already subject to public audit. Such regulation
cannot effectively provide adequate consumer protection. It is most
unlikely that any regulatory agency will have the personnel available
to permit any audit in depth of the records of licensees. Assuming,
however, that careful audits are conducted, what will the auditor find?
The real complaints, such as overcharging, forced selling, shoddy goods,
and abuse of process in collection, will not appear in any records which
the auditor sees. They will probably not appear in D's records and,
certainly, not in F's records. Furthermore, the rule-making machinery
of most administrative agencies is so cumbersome and the require-
ments for revoking a license so onerous that except in the most
extreme cases, the public is likely to receive little benefit from such
regulation.
25. Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 CoLu.f. L R1v. 387,
428-40 (1968).
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The absence of regulation need not mean that lenders will not be
responsible for acts of their borrowers under all circumstances. His-
torically a lender has rarely been held liable for acts of his borrower,
no matter how objectionable the practices may have been, except where
the lender had an equity, was a principal-in-fact, or was engaged in a
joint venture. A recent decision of the California Supreme Court, how-
ever, indicates the possible beginning of a common law doctrine holding
a lender liable for the acts and practices of his borrower where the lender
becomes too closely implicated in his borrower's business. In Connor
v. Great Western Savings and Loan Association,20 Chief Justice Tray-
nor, speaking for a narrow majority of a closely divided court, found
that a savings and loan association which had no equity interest at
all in its borrower could be held responsible for its borrower's negli-
gence to third parties.
The facts in Connor are unusual, but the very existence of the
holding is of great significance. Defendant savings and loan association
lent the sum of about $3,000,000 to a real estate developer. The devel-
oper himself put less than $50,000 into the business-a "thin equity"
situation reminiscent of that in which the corporate veil is pierced.
The investment certainly was much more than a prudent regulated
lender of any kind should have made and, at best, was of questionable
legality. The developer built on adobe soil, common in Southern
California. Adobe soil expands greatly after a heavy rainfall with dis-
astrous effects upon foundations-a fact that a developer or savings and
loan association in Southern California might fairly be expected to
know. Although a special building technique for foundations in adobe
soil exists, the developer negligently failed to employ it, and the
foundations sank. The owners of the homes sued the savings and loan
association, apparently on the theory of a joint venture, A majority
of the California Supreme Court held the complaint stated a cause of
action for a direct suit against the lender. Mr. Justice Traynor's ap-
proach is reminiscent of MacPherson v. Buick, 27 for he found that, on
the pleadings at least, the lender could, and reasonably should, have
anticipated the risk of injury to the plaintiffs and that it was under
an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them.
Connor is a significant decision certain to generate much comment
and controversy. It is too early to guess at its importance, except to
remark that it proves that the common law has lost neither its generative
26. 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
27. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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power nor its quality of unpredictability. It would not be a very great
exteftsion of Connor to hold F legally responsible to A where F is too
closely implicated in misconduct by D. Connor certainly sharpens F's
dilemma: if he remains too distant from D and keeps all transactions
on a formal basis (which, incidentally, is bad practice for a bank and
suicidal for a finance company), he runs the risk of being held liable
for D's practices which he should have known about but which did not
come to his attention. On the other hand, if the lender does follow the
account too closely, he may become liable under Connor. Certainly
it would be to the public benefit for financers to accept this risk and to
follow their borrowers closely for abuses, but what is F to do when it
discovers the abuse and lacks the power-or, frankly, the desire-to do
something to cure it? There are no pat answers, and financing con-
sumer paper is not likely to be a dull occupation in the near future.
While the courts fix the parameters of Connor, the wisdom of re-
quiring the registration of lenders seems questionable. A better course
of action would be to give the persons actually injured by D substan-
tial rights of action and to make behavior that is sufficiently outra-
geous a violation of the criminal laws. The false advertising statutes
which have been proposed and, in a few cases, adopted28 partially im-
plement this proposal. Encouraging class actions and similar repre-
sentative suits2 9 against offenders would be advisable; both private
parties and public agencies should be granted the right to bring rep-
resentative actions. For example, where a store is selling by false
advertising, anyone induced by such advertising to purchase merchan-
dise should be granted an action on behalf of himself and all others
similarly affected. Broad injunctions running in favor of the public
could be made mandatory in appropriate cases. Bad trade practices can
be prohibited. For example, if certain kinds of door-to-door selling
regularly produce fraudulent results, then the practice ought to be
made aL misdemeanor. Perhaps the criminal laws ought to be changed
28. See Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection; The Uniform Deceptive TradePractices Act, 76 Y.L L.J. 485 (1967). The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction
to enjoin false advertising in certain instances but as a practical matter is unlikely to
enjoin minor instances. The state attorney general may have jurisdiction in such instances.29. The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code gives the Administrator tie rightto seek injunctions against fraudulent and unconscionable conduct in Section 6.111,but the section quoted in Jordan & Warren, supra note 25, at n.102. is quite narrow
and is restricted to injuries caused "primarily because die transactions involved are
credit transactions." The Uniform Consumer Credit Code gives no wide offensive powersto any private party; chiefly it follows the pattern of the usury laws and requires aforfeiture for unconscionability. Jordan & Warren, supra note 25, at 427-128. This isreally unnecessary; the courts can get to that point simply by using the unconscion-
ability provisions of UCC § 2-302.
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where appropriate so as to give private persons the right to force a
public agency to initiate legal action. The history of the enforcement
of housing ordinances suggests that the public must not entrust en-
forcement to a small overworked official staff. Private parties could be
allowed to sue for an injunction on behalf of the public if criminal
prosecution is not initiated. Appropriate provisions for attorney's fees
should be included in the statutes for the practical purpose of en-
couraging lawyers practicing in the ghetto areas to bring such lawsuits.
Public regulation alone is most unlikely to be successful in this
area. A small glimpse at history is instructive. The forms of market
and mercantile regulation in the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods
are now historical curiosities, while the action of deceit and the equity
procedure for rescission introduced at about the same time not only
survive, changed to suit the needs of the times, but have living issue
in the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision"° and SEC Rule lOb-5.
C. The Dealer's Other Creditors-Perfection by Possession or Filing;
Stamping the Chattel Paper
The transaction by which D assigns his chattel paper, his secured
rights, to F is itself a security transaction. If F has a perfected security
interest in the paper so sold, F is a secured creditor, who, fraud aside,
is protected from any attempt by D's creditors to treat his advance as a
mere unsecured loan. To protect his rights, F must insure that the
appropriate procedures have been followed to perfect his security in-
terest in the chattel paper and, if necessary, the proceeds from that
paper.
The Uniform Commercial Code authorizes two different means of
perfecting a security interest-(1) taking possession of the collateral
and (2) filing a Financing Statement (Form UCC-1) with the appro-
priate registry office. Both are available for chattel paper. Section
9-304(1) permits perfection of a security interest in chattel paper by
filing, and Section 9-305 permits perfection "by taking possession of the
collateral." If F has perfected his security interest, either by filing or
by taking possession, he will be protected against a claim by D's cred-
itors or trustee in bankruptcy that he is only an unsecured creditor.
Possession, the first method of perfecting a security interest in
chattel paper provided by the Code requires F to take physical pos-
session of the paper. Where the chattel paper generated by a trans-
80. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), ret,'d in part,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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action between A and D consists of more than one document, potential
problems of perfecting by possession arise. By Section 9-105(b), chattel
paper may consist of a security agreement or equipment lease alone,
or the document plus a negotiable instrument. In transactions where
a negotiable instrument is given, there is a risk that D will discount
the note to one financer and sell the security interest to another. In
this case, the holder of the note will have a cause of action vis-a-vis A,
and the holder of the security agreement will have only a worthless
piece of paper. His only claim will be against D for fraud.
A related risk occurs when A executes several copies of the same
security agreement (but does not execute a note), and D then assigns
one copy to each of several financers-a classic case of double financ-
ing. Plainly the holder of the original security agreement takes priority
over all holders of mere copies. But what happens where both fmancers
take copies or where A has executed duplicate originals at D's request?
If D has filed the original as a financing statement with tie appro-
priate registry office, there will only be copies. The problem has not
been presented to the courts for determination.
Perfecting security by possession raises further difficulties as soon
as F does not take possession itself but appoints another as his agent.
Where the agent or custodian is an independent third person having
no relationship to D, there can be no objection. However, a practice
exists in some segments of the finance industry of appointing an
employee of D as "custodian" or "agent" of F for the purpose of taking
possession of the paper, under an agreement providing for nominal
consideration. An allied practice is for F to lease from D those filing
cabinets in D's office which contain the paper. In both instances, the
transaction is more formal than real; the "custodian" continues to be
an employee of D, and D continues to have control over his own files.
Sections 9-205 and 9-305 (especially Official Comment 2) make it evi-
dent that a person controlled by his debtor cannot be an agent for a
secured party. Therefore, insofar as such devices are intended to have
more than a psychological effect, they are useless. The Code's prejudice
against Benedict v. Ratner has not relaxed the common law require-
ments of possession.31
F's perfected security interest in the chattel paper does not, without
further action, give him a perfected interest in the proceeds of that
paper. Proceeds are an entirely different class of collateral under the
31. UCC § 9-205, Comment 6.
951
The Yale Law Journal
Code; if F does not have a secured interest in the proceeds and the
paper has been converted into proceeds-say by the sale of the goods
covered thereby-the proceeds will go into a fund for the general
creditors despite F's preferred position with regard to the chattel paper.
For ten days after receipt by the debtor, proceeds are automatically
perfected. After the expiration of the ten days, however, a perfected
security interest in the proceeds can only be obtained by filing.32 Where
F has perfected his security in the chattel paper by filing a financing
statement, he need only check the proceeds box on the form to secure
his interest in the proceeds. Such a filing against proceeds, however,
can produce the very problem it was meant to prevent. This odd result
arises from the language of Official Comment 3 to Section 9-306: "A
claim to proceeds in a filed financing statement might be considered as
impliedly authorizing sale or other disposition of the collateral, depend-
ing on the circumstances of the parties, the nature of the collateral,
the course of dealing of the parties and the usage of trade." With all
due respect, the Comment is wrong.8 3 If F does not file against "pro-
ceeds," he loses all rights to those proceeds in the event that D dis-
poses of the collateral. The only reason for F to file against proceeds
would be to protect himself against the very act which the Code now
implies he may tacitly have authorized. Luckily, the wording of the
Comment is indefinite. It refers to custom, understanding of the trade,
and other considerations. In the absence of specific trade considerations
to the contrary, F's chances of avoiding loss seem greatest if he files
against the proceeds.
In practice, the choice between taking actual possession and filing
as a means of perfecting the security interest is related to the character
of the goods which form the basis of the security. The Code differen-
tiates between equipment, inventory, and consumer goods.8' For prac-
tical reasons, it is often difficult or inconvenient for F to take physical
possession of consumer chattel paper which must remain in D's hands
as administrator of the contract for collection. Where F buys con-
sumer paper, he will ordinarily file a financing statement on Form
UCC-1 against D and stamp the paper to show that it has been
assigned. If nonconsumer goods or large consumer items, such as auto-
32. UCC § 9-306(3).
33. The odd thing about this Official Comment is that it is utterly unnecessary. The
problem is already covered in the statute itself, for UCC § 9-306(2) says that a security
interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, etc., by the debtor "unless his
action was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise."(Emphasis added.)
34. These terms are defined in UCC § 9-109.
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mobiles or trailers, are the subject matter of the transaction, F will
usually take physical possession of the paper. Where F is in possession
of the paper, D may prevent F from filing the assignment.
Official Comment No. 2 to Section 9-308 suggests that where chattel
paper is left in the originator's possession, F may protect his interest
by stamping the chattel paper with a legend indicating that he has
taken a security interest in it. This will protect F against a subsequent
claim by a financer that he took possession innocently and without
knowledge of the prior assignment to F. Stamping itself is neither
possession nor filing, and therefore does not perfect a security interest
in the event of a bankruptcy. F should file as well as stamp. Since
stamping is not in itself a method of perfection, a financer who files
first will take priority, other things being equal, over one who files
later and stamps. If the second financer wishes to take advantage of
the preference accorded physical possession, he must take possession.
Stamping is a shield against subsequent possession by others, not a
sword to strike down prior filings. Stamping creates some interesting
problems. If D-presumably with fraudulent intent-removes the
stamp, thereby altering the chattel paper, and resells the altered paper
to an innocent purchaser for value, who then has priority? It would
appear, by analogy to the forgery of a negotiable instrument,35 that the
innocent purchaser would take priority. Furthermore, the first F could
have taken physical possession of the paper but did not, and although
himself innocent thereby made the fraud possible.
D. Bona Fide Purchasers of the Collateral
F's security interest in the chattel paper includes not only A's prom-
ise to pay (with possible recourse to D) but also by definition an
interest in the rights of D to the collateral which secures the first level
transaction. Almost every security agreement requires the debtor to
retain possession of the collateral and to keep it fully insured and free
and clear of all liens and encumbrances. While the vast majority of all
debtors do keep these agreements, so great is the volume of security
transactions that unauthorized sales by A in violation of the security
agreement present a significant problem. In those cases where A dis-
poses of goods in violation of the security agreement, he is said to have
sold them "out of trust." If the purchase is made in good faith and
for value, the purchaser may contest F's claim to the goods since both
35. Gruntal v. National Surety Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1980); UCC 3-419.
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F and the purchaser have taken bona fide interests in the property for
value.
Under the Code the rights of the parties in the event of an out of
trust sale depend on whether the goods sold are classified as consumer
goods, inventory, or equipment. In the case of consumer goods, Section
9-307(2) provides that a buyer who purchases goods for value, for his
personal, household, or family use, takes free and clear of a security
interest unless a financing statement has been filed. If a financing
statement has, in fact, been filed, the interest of the secured party is
paramount. While the Code affords the holders of secured interests
this means of protection against out of trust sales, it is often not
exercised. By Section 9-302(l)(d), it is not necessary to file in order
to perfect D's security interest against other lienors claiming the same
goods as security.30 Thus even if D does not file against A and is thus
not protected against an out of trust sale for value, he has a "perfected"
security interest and is protected against A's trustee in bankruptcy.
Consequently, in practice, it is relatively rare for secured parties to
file for consumer goods except in the case of "big ticket" items such
as automobiles, tractors and boats.
In the case of "equipment," the interest of the secured party con-
tinues in the event of a resale unless there is some waiver or consent
to the sale. On the other hand, there is no protection for the holder
of a secured interest upon "inventory" in the event of resale in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business. Even in cases where the person
who purchases the inventory knows that the security interest exists,
his rights to the goods will be paramount. Since the only reason that
inventory is acquired by a going business is for resale, it is reasonable
to assume that some provision has been made in the security agree-
ment for the sale of the goods. Only in the rare case of a bulk sale or
an obvious fraud might another rule be applied. Of course, no sensible
bank, finance company or lender will knowingly engage in chattel
paper financing of inventory or consumer goods on the same basis as it
would for equipment, unless it can protect itself or there are excellent
business reasons for doing so. Where chattel paper is purchased without
F's lending officer being aware that he is buying inventory paper be-
cause the fact was concealed and the lending officer finds out the fact
afterwards, he will immediately suspect fraud and move to protect
himself.
36. 2 GILMoRE § 27.1.
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The three classes into which the Code divides collateral are reasonably
discrete. Only one difficulty occurs with any degree of frequency-A
may acquire items for use either as inventory or equipment. This situa-
tion is common to dealers in construction equipment who resell items
to the trade (inventory) and who also maintain a rental fleet (equip-
ment). Suppose that D sells A a machine to be placed in A's rental fleet
and files against A, and that A sells the machine to a customer and
thereby treats is as inventory. The most sensible solution to this problem
is to place the risk of loss on D and F, who, by putting the equipment
into the hands of a person in the trade who appears able to pass good
tide, made the transaction possible. A practical solution to this prob-
lem on the part of the lender is to require A to separate his operations
into two different companies with separate sets of books and operations
and to police A's transactions. Few lenders seem willing to accept this
responsibility; most are more likely simply to accept the risks involved.
E. Other Purchasers of the Same Chattel Paper-Priority Problems
Let us now consider the situation where two parties claim security
interests in the same chattel paper or in the proceeds of such chattel
paper. It is worthwhile to spell out the various instances in which
different classes of security interest may conflict by claiming the same
collateral:
1. Two security interests in the same chattel paper.
2. A security interest in chattel paper versus a security interest in the
proceeds of chattel paper.
3. A security interest in chattel paper versus a security interest in the
proceeds of inventory.
4. A security interest in the proceeds of chattel paper versus a security
interest in inventory.
5. A security interest in the proceeds of chattel paper versius a security
interest in the proceeds of inventory.
6. A security interest in the proceeds of chattel paper versus a se-
curity interest in an account.
7. Two security interests in the proceeds of the same chattel paper.
Conflicts between financers arise because it is not uncommon for D to
pledge his chattel paper with several financers or to pledge inventory
with one financer (who will then have rights in the proceeds) while
pledging chattel paper arising out of the sale of that inventory with
another financer. As Gilmore points out, chattel paper financing is prof-
itable to banks and finance companies while inventory financing is less
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profitable and usually carries a higher risk. If a single F contracts to
finance all of the chattel paper and inventory of D, conflicts such as
above cannot arise unless D, in an attempt to obtain better terms or
services, breaches his contract. Where neither the financing of D's inven-
tory nor his chattel paper is tied to a single F, it is entirely common for
D, happily polygamous, to place paper with a number of F's who com-
pete against each other in terms, services, and rates. As soon as there is
a multiplicity of F's, the risk of inadvertent conflict between their rights
increases as do the opportunities for D to engage in fraud. Some of
the finer horror stories of fraud told among commercial counsel involve
chattel paper; the most famous recent case is that of Billie Sol Estes. For
all the combinations and permutations set forth the author has no hope
that he has covered all the possibilities of fraud. The Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, who, by virtue of his position, is
always an authority on fraud, once sighed in an opinion that fraud was
like Cleopatra-age could not wither nor custom stale its infinite
variety.37
For the purposes of this discussion we shall call the two financers
holding adverse security interests in the same collateral "F-i" and "F-2."
1. Conflicts between secured parties claiming an interest in the same
chattel paper
As we have seen, overlapping claims of interest by two parties in the
same collateral may arise from fraudulent double financing by D or from
negligence where F does not adequately police the loan.88 In all cases,
the Code allows perfection of a security interest in chattel paper either
by filing or by taking possession of the paper. By either means, a security
interest which is perfected takes priority over one which is not. When
37. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 n.12 (161).
38. Financers will usually protect themselves from fraud or destruction of security
by requiring proper documentation of the transaction from D. F will usually demand
that D deliver to it (1) the original chattel paper, including any negotiable instruments,
or proof of its existence if it is to be left with D for collection; (2) proper assignments
of the chattel paper; (3) proof that A has accepted the goods (this may be D's invoice
to A, but in a substantial deal, a careful lender will require a "Delivery and Installation
Certificate" in which A acknowledges receipt and installation of the goods and states
that they are satisfactory); (4) insurance on the goods as required; and (5) evidence
that D has filed a financing statement against A on Form UCC-1 with all appropriate
filing officers as required by the Code. F may also file an assignment of this financing
statement on Form UCC-3 which will show that the original interest in the goods has
been assigned from D to F. This is not required to perfect F's security interest in the
paper vis-ti-vis D and, in fact, will not substitute for a direct filing by F against D or
for the physical possession of the chattel paper. Form UCC-3, however, will protect F
against collusion between D and A where D releases the original filing against A.
Whether or not F files Form UCC-3 depends on the size of the transaction, and the
estimate of tile risk of collusion between D and A.
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both security interests are perfected, it becomes necessary to work out
an order of priorities. Section 9-308, which contains the Code's priority
plan, gives preference to the holder of a security interest in chattel
paper perfected by possession over the holder of a security interest in
the same paper perfected by filing, provided that the possessor has (a)
given "new value," (b) taken possession in the ordinary course of his
business, and (c) did not have knowledge that the specific paper was
subject to a security interest at the time he took possession. "Knowledge"
is defined in Section 1-201(25) as actual knowledge, not merely
constructive notice. Accordingly, the buyer of chattel paper who intends
to take possession does well not to search the records, another example
of the Code's propensity for the "Rule of the Pure Heart and Empty
Head."39 By implication, of course, the holder of a security interest
perfected by filing takes priority over the holder of a possessory inter-
est if the possessor did not advance "new value," bought outside the
ordinary course of his business, or had actual knowledge.
The reader will observe that where both F-1 and F-29 satisfy Sec-
tion 9-308, F-2, who is later in time, prevails. As we shall see, this
preference for the later "purchase money" security interest runs
throughout this area, a notable reversal of the usual situation where
priority goes to the party first in time. The underlying theory adopted
by the Code draftsmen was that the new value put in by the holder
of the second interest created a fund which could be applied to the
payment of outstanding obligations, including that of F-I.40 F-1 might
well object that since this problem usually arises out of fraudulent
double financing, it is likely to gain little practical advantage from the
new value introduced by F-2. Although F-1 is admittedly entitled to
the proceeds received from F-29, identification of those proceeds, a
necessity if F-1 is to maintain its security interest, is usually impossible.
The draftsmen of the Code would certainly reply that if F-1 had
watched his debtor, he would have been able to identify the proceeds
received. This is not always a reasonable assumption; it is folk wisdom
among bankers that "if a borrower is going to cheat you, you can't
stop him." Though somewhat unfair from F-i's point of view, the rule
seems quite just from F-2's vantage. F-2 has enriched the estate with
his payment. Why should F-1 be allowed to gain at his expense? The
39. See Felsenfeld, Knowledge as a Factor in Determining Priorities under the Uni-form Commercial Code, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 246 (1967).
40. The history of the purchase money priority may be found in Gilmore. The Pur-
chase Money Priority, 76 H.nv. L. REv. 1333 (1963). It is astonishing how rarely the
courts have articulated the reasons for this rule, or, for that matter, any priority rule.
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general preference of the Code in this area for the later contributor
of new funds runs directly against the natural propensity of all com-
mercial law to favor the first interest to be perfected.
Where the two security interests both take by filing, the party first to
file wins.4' The reason for this is obvious; there is no excuse for not
searching when one intends to rely upon a filing.
Where both parties claim by possession, the party with the original
chattel paper should prevail. The problems which exist where two
parties claim by possession and both hold originals or copies are more
difficult to solve. For its decision, a court could rely upon several pos-
sible lines of distinction: (i) simple priority in time-which financer
first took possession of the paper; (ii) the existence of a negotiable in-
strument-if A had executed a negotiable instrument in addition to
the two security agreements, the F holding possession of the note will
claim priority; (iii) filing-one F may have filed against D as an addi-
tional measure; (iv) notice to A-one F may have given notice to A
and, perhaps, required direct payment; and (v) diligence-the possi-
bility of a fraud may have come to the attention of one of the F's
but not the other. A fair priority scheme where both individuals were
in possession might be the following:
First Priority: The holder of a negotiable instrument would take
priority over all other F's in the absence of fraud to which he was
a party.4
Second Priority: If either party had reason to suspect double financ-
ing but failed to verify such suspicion, he would be subordinate
to all holders of perfected securities who had no reason to sus-
pect double financing.
Third Priority: Any F who filed against chattel paper would take
priority on a notice basis, over all F's who thereafter bought
chattel paper covered by the filing. Otherwise, filing by F's
would be disregarded as among perfected security interests.
Fourth Priority: Any F who is collecting directly from A would
take priority over all F's who have permitted D to retain control
over collections.
Residual Priority: Whichever F purchased first in time would take
priority.
2. A security interest in chattel paper versus a security interest in the
proceeds of chattel paper
This problem, which is of a rather esoteric nature, can arise in the
41. UCC § 9-312(5)(a).
42. This would seem mandated by UCC § 9-309.
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following manner. D sells to F-1 chattel paper covering his sale of a
tractor to an account debtor, A-1. A-1 returns the tractor to D, who
accepts the return and cancels the debt which A-1 owes to him. The
obligation which forms the basis of the original chattel paper no longer
exists. D then sells or leases the tractor to A-2, another account debtor,
thereby creating another piece of chattel paper. D "finances" this trans-
action by selling the second piece of chattel paper to F-2 who perfects
his security interest, presumably by possession. This transaction is sim-
ilar to double financing and is almost certainly a violation of the
agreement between D and F-1. Practices of this nature do occur, how-
ever, especially in the construction trades and other businesses where
returns are common. Both F-1 and F-2 now claim a priority interest in
the chattel paper. F-2's right is grounded in his purchase of the paper
from D for value, while F-i's right, presuming he has filed against
proceeds, is based on the fact that the new chattel paper resulted from
the disposal of his security.The dispute is then between F-2 as holder
of the chattel paper and F-1 as holder of a security interest in the
proceeds of chattel paper.
The Code is anything but clear as to which financer prevails. Section
9-308, which should have covered this problem, does not do so. The
rational solution would be to treat this as a dispute between two holders
of a security interest in the same chattel paper and to give F-2 preference
if he has advanced new value, does not have actual knowledge, and has
purchased in the ordinary course of his business. As in the case of over-
lapping security, F-2's new value has improved the financial position of
D and created a fund from which F-1 might draw. One may fairly
assume on the basis of Section 9-308 that this is what the draftsmen of
the Code intended.
But the Code places obstacles in the path of this simple, commercially
reasonable conclusion. Compounding the difficulties created by the
omission of this problem from Section 9-308, the draftsmen, in dealing
with returned goods under Section 9-306(5)(b) provided only that the
holder of chattel paper should take priority if he were entitled to
priority under Section 9-308, a road sign that points nowhere. With
no special provisions for priority to cover this case, we are left to the
catch-all priority provision of the Code, Section 9-312(5)(b), which
assigns priorities in the order in which the interests were perfected.
Since F-1 perfected earlier in time than F-2, this provision would give
priority to F-1. Thus technical interpretation leads to an uncommercial
result.
Karl Llewellyn always preached the wisdom of finding a technical
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solution to a technical impasse; he believed in untying knots in the law
rather than in cutting them. One may suggest two technical solutions.
Section 9-307(1) provides that when a purchaser buys from a seller in
the regular course of the seller's business, such a purchaser takes free
and clear of any security interest created by the seller regardless of
whether the purchaser knew of the security interest or whether the
security interest was perfected. Purchase is defined by the Code to in-
clude taking by lien or security interest.43 The requirements in Sec-
tions 9-307 and 9-308 that the transaction be in the regular course of
business are not identical; Section 9-307 requires the sale to be in the
regular course of D's business while Section 9-308 requires the trans-
action to be in the regular course of F's business. The discrepancy,
however narrow, leads to a satisfactory result. If the sale of the chattel
paper to F-2 is sufficiently unusual, F-2 should be on notice of possible
difficulty and charged with accepting the risks involved in proceeding
with the transaction.
An alternative technical solution may be available under Section
9-312(4), the general purchase money priority provision. That section
gives priority to a perfected purchase money lien over all conflicting
security interests in the same collateral and could be interpreted to
favor a financer who, though later in time, advanced new value to D
and accepted the chattel paper as security. As we shall see, this solution
could also be applicable to other problems which arise in this area.
3. A security interest in chattel paper versus a security interest in the
proceeds of inventory
This problem is specifically covered in the second sentence of Section
9-308, which provides that a purchaser of chattel paper who gives new
value and takes possession of the paper in the ordinary course of his
business has priority over a claim for proceeds of inventory, even where
the chattel paper financer has actual knowledge of the pre-existing in-
ventory lien. According to the Official Comment to Section 9-308, this
priority was established in order to encourage the financing of chattel
paper out of inventory.44
4. A security interest in the proceeds of chattel paper versus a security
interest in inventory
This problem arises as in the previous case, when goods are returned
to D by A, the account debtor, and held in inventory by D. F-2, an in-
43. UCC § 1-201(33).
44. UCC § 9-308, Comment 2. See discussion in Felsenfeld, supra note 39, at 265-68.
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ventory lender, then lends against the goods, presumably on the basis
of some kind of regular inventory financing. F-2 may have given new
value, and, in any case, has acted in complete innocence. Thus, we
reach a situation where both F-1 and F-2 have acted innocently, given
new value, and perfected their respective security interests. This prob-
lem also is specifically covered by Section 9-306 (5), which provides that
the holder of the security interest in the inventory takes priority. This
result is consistent with the general rule that the purchase money secu-
rity interest later in time receives priority where both parties act inno-
cently. Note also that here as in all transactions in which goods are
returned, the financer of the first chattel paper could have protected
himself by collecting directly from A.
5. A security interest in chattel paper versus a security interest in the
proceeds of inventory
6. A security interest in chattel paper versus a security interest in
accounts
These situations arise in substantially the same manner as did situa-
tion (4). D sells goods to A-1 and sells the chattel paper thereby created
to F-i. A-1 returns the goods to D. While in inventory, the goods are
advanced against by F-2. The goods are then sold by D to A-2, a new
account debtor. The final sale will result in the creation either of an
account (as defined in Section 9-106) or of new chattel paper, depending
on whether or not D has retained a security interest. For purposes of
analysis, let us assume the simplest transaction where D does not re-
finance the chattel paper generated as a result of the sale to A-2. D will
then have possession of the new chattel paper, and both F-1 and F-2 will
claim it as the proceeds of their respective interests in chattel paper and
inventory.
This situation is not covered by Section 9-308. Similarly, Section
9-306(5), which sets forth the rules for priorities in returned merchan-
dise, is silent on rights in the proceeds of such goods.
The problem presented by two perfected purchase money security
interests in the same collateral is whether to follow Section 9-312(5)(b)
or Section 9-312(4). Section 9-312(5)(b) relies on the sequence of filing
and, unless another rule specifically applies, gives priority to the first
party to perfect its secured interest; the section expressly states that it
applies to purchase money security interests not otherwise disposed of.
Section 9-312(4) would seem to favor the party whose interest arose
last, on the theory that his payment constituted a fund from which
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the first party could be paid. However, this rule has not been codified
and the Official Comments are silent. Technically, the Code would
appear to favor F-1. In the entire Code, however, there are no signifi-
cant instances (with a single possible exception which has not been
resolved 45) in which a later purchase money interest is subordinated
to an earlier one. It would seem to make better commercial sense to
turn these repeated instances into a rule. Rather than depend on a
meaningless sequence of time, the Code would then prevent the un-
reasonable consequences of making F-1 both the recipient of the
money paid by F-2 and a superior lienor.
7. Two conflicting security interests, both arising out of proceeds in
chattel paper
This situation is similar in principle to (5) and (6). A purchase
money security interest will take priority over a nonpurchase money
security interest, and as between two purchase money interests-here
a rare case-priority will follow the rule which the courts elect to ap-
ply to fact situations (5) and (6).
IV. Summary and Conclusion
The present distinction between "true" equipment leases and Code
security agreements is illogical in cases where the lease covers a sub-
stantial amount of equipment for more than a short period. Such leases
are financing devices. No reason exists for not treating lessees like sell-
ers in other financial transactions. All equipment leases for a period
of more than three months involving equipment to be used for com-
mercial purposes where the lease provides for rent in excess of $5,000
should be made subject to the Uniform Commercial Code.
The Code distinguishes between the classes of chattel paper arising
out of transactions involving consumer goods, inventory and equip-
ment. The Code rules turn on these distinctions. To date, few border-
line cases have arisen. The statutory distinctions reflect functional dif-
ferences and are working well.
45. By inadvertence, the drafters of the Code omitted any determination of which
interest should prevail in the event of a controversy between the holder of a security
interest in the proceeds of inventory and the holder of a security interest in accounts
generated by the sale of such inventory. The argument in the text assumes the holder
of the interest in the accounts would prevail. See Kripke, Priorities Between Claimants
to Accounts as Proceeds of Inventory and Related Problems, 41 N.Y.U.L. RrV. 687, 709-19
(1966). Contra, Henson, Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 NomE 1)ANI
LAW. 425, 428-32 (1966).
962
Vol. 78: 935, 1969
Security Interests in Chattel Paper
Chattel paper arising out of the sale of consumer goods is an area
in which strain upon the Code is beginning to appear. The draftsmen
of the Code looked to the commercial practice in existence at the time
of writing for the pattern of norms to be followed. They left room for
consumer rights legislation by stating that the Code would subordinate
itself to specific legislation governing retail installment sales and by
permitting an exemption to the "commercial specialty" rule for con-
sumer paper. The draftsmen did not foresee any developments whereby
F would be made to police the dealers from whom he bought paper.
There is now at least a strong possibility that legislation of this type
will be passed. In such a case, the best course of action to follow would
be to add a separate section to Article 9 which would establish a new
pattern of perfection for consumer goods chattel paper or, preferably,
to add a section which would put precisely stated obligations upon F.
Licensing laws for financers are undesirable. The procedure required
would be slow and cumbersome, and would complicate the flow of
commerce between the states by raising questions of jurisdiction and
the power to regulate. At the same time the consumer would not have
a direct interest in the regulation but would have to rely upon an in-
dustry-oriented agency to correct misfeasance. The best solution to the
problem is to grant consumers direct rights against abuses by dealers
and financers (if financers are to be involved), or to regulate D's di-
rectly. Representative actions and class actions should be used for such
purposes. Both public agencies and private parties directly injured
should have standing to bring these actions; practice acts should be
amended accordingly. In the meantime, common law development,
whose future course cannot be predicted, has begun.
The provisions of the Code dealing with the financing of equipment
chattel paper appear to be working relatively well, although they are
not free from difficulty. The Code emphasizes the rights of a person
who takes physical possession of chattel paper and assimilates his posi-
tion to that of the holder of a negotiable instrument. So long as we
are discussing A's obligations to make payment, few difficulties are pre-
sented by such an arrangement. Problems do arise as to who is entitled
to equipment which is sold out of trust by A. Problems of priority be-
tween secured parties also exist. The Code is not clear on a number
of priority questions and to date there is little case law. Many such
problems are negotiated out of court by the institutional lenders con-
cerned. To date, these priority problems are not so numerous as to re-
quire a substantial reworking of the Code in this area; case law can be
trusted to make what changes are necessary. If changes are to be made,
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Section 9-308 should more explicitly set forth the general principle
that where two security interests in the same collateral both represent
advances of new funds made in good faith, the interest later in time
should take priority, except where a specific provision of the Code
mandates another result. Perhaps some of these changes could be made
by amending the Official Comments, as opposed to changing the statute
itself.
Apart from bad credit decisions, the main threat to financers of
equipment chattel paper is fraud. Physical possession of the chattel
paper can eliminate these problems in many cases. Notifying the
account debtor or collecting directly from him will eliminate many
others. In interpreting the Code, the Courts should give preference,
so far as may be fair, to those financers who have used notification fi-
nancing. A lender who engages in non-notification financing and omits
to institute controls over his debtor has in effect made the fraud possi-
ble and, as against another innocent party, has little equity on his side.
In general, the problems arising in chattel paper financing are not
serious and can be handled within the scope of the Code. The real
changes which are needed are those in the field of consumer chattel
paper, which are outside the scope of classic commercial law. To
date, the Code is working well.
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